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From 16 CIB Panel Ch's
Re "CIB 1963-65"

9 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence *mt*

25X1B In response to a request from the Deputy Director the attached current guidelines for the production of the [REDACTED] the Current Intelligence Bulletin and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review have been prepared for your information. Other ad hoc or temporary OCI publications are prepared in response to specific requirements given us by the principal consumers. For example, the Vietnam Checklist for the Director of Central Intelligence in its present form was developed as a response to a White House requirement for greater detail on all aspects of the Vietnam problem.

25X1A [REDACTED]

Acting Director
Current Intelligence

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Guidelines for the Central Intelligence Bulletin*

1. There are three basic criteria which all CIB items must meet.

a. They must be concerned with national security. The definition of "national security" used in the US Government is so broad, however, that the formula gives virtually no guidance to the selector. It merely requires that an item present information pertaining to developments--potential or actual--which impinge fairly directly on important interests of the US.

b. They must present intelligence. This means that they must deal primarily with foreign actions or policies rather than those of the US. This distinction is not easy to maintain, however, since the conduct of foreign affairs is a continuous process of action and reaction between the US and other nations. It is most difficult to discuss a foreign action, for instance, without relating it--either implicitly or explicitly--to the US action which stimulated it.

c. They must be important enough to be worth the attention of members of the National Security Council. In other words, an item must deal with a matter which is now or has the potential of becoming the subject of consideration at the Presidential or NSC level. This

*Since the CIB is coordinated with State and DIA, these guidelines were drawn up and given to these Agencies several months ago in an effort to develop common understanding as to the mission of the CIB.

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criterion is exceptionally difficult to define further because of the large element of subjective judgment built into it. Furthermore, the interest of high-level readers will vary from day to day and individual to individual.

2. Beyond these theoretical considerations, there are also a number of practical ones. The day-to-day make-up of the CIB is largely determined by the interplay of the following factors:

a. Degree of government interest. When the policy-making apparatus has focussed its attention on a crisis, its appetite for detail is insatiable. Items are printed in the CIB which would in normal times never be considered. On the other hand, lack of high-level interest in a potentially dangerous situation can often be a reason for periodically calling attention to it. Since such situations can remain unchanged for months, this sometimes requires the use of a relatively unimportant piece of new information as a "peg" on which to hang what is basically a repetitive reminder that the problem continues to exist.

b. Continuity. CIA must ask itself whether each piece of raw information records a new development or adds detail to one already recorded in the CIB, and whether it tends to change or to reinforce assessments already published. When something is new or when a judgment should be changed, there is pressure to publish in the CIB. This is especially true if the direction of events is running counter to a National Intelligence Estimate. On the other hand, crises which simmer along for several days with no detectable change must not be allowed to drop out of sight. There is a danger that the policy-maker, seeing no intelligence reporting, might assume that the situation is improving. Pressure therefore builds up to report even when no significant information has been received.

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c. Timeliness. Items otherwise important enough for the CIB may be withheld because the events they predict are scheduled to occur before the CIB is distributed or because the government has already reacted to the information. Items may also be withheld because they are so long-range that delay for one reason or another will do no harm.

d. Open-source Reporting. If incoming raw intelligence is paralleled by accurate press reporting, pressures for CIB publication may be decreased. On the other hand, if press reporting is contradictory, incomplete, or inaccurate, items of lesser importance may be selected for CIB treatment in order to clarify situations for the reader.

e. Length. There are no limits on length of the CIB, but CIA believes that high-level readership will be overloaded if the normal CIB runs much beyond a dozen items a day. Of course, all items of obvious importance are printed, but it is also true that an item of marginal importance is more likely to be printed on a day when the CIB is short than on one when it is long.

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Guidelines for the Production
of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review

1. Our basic aim in producing the CIWR is to create a document which treats the important events of the week thoughtfully and analytically, puts them into perspective more fully than can be done in other regular current intelligence publications, identifies significant trends, and attempts at least a brief glimpse, where possible, into the near future.
2. The emphasis of the CIWR is largely political, but military and economic developments receive due treatment and indeed often constitute a considerable portion of the book.
3. Since space in the Weekly is, though generous in comparison with most Current Intelligence publications, still at a premium, we do not strive to duplicate the national press in its comprehensive coverage of the news. On the other hand, we do not hesitate to handle topics which have received full press treatment when we have intelligence to add or more accurate analysis to apply. In many instances, the CIWR handles subjects which have earlier been discussed in other current intelligence publications. The Weekly, however, stresses analysis as against mere reporting. The writer of the Weekly article, having more space at his disposal than the writer of a CIB article, can develop his thoughts more fully and fill in more of the background of his story than can the latter.
4. The CIWR provides a vehicle for taking bits and pieces which individually are not significant enough to be printed in the CIB, for example, and constructing from them a story which is not only interesting but of real intelligence value.

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5. The Special Reports, although distributed under separate covers, are considered as parts of the Weekly and are planned and processed in the same manner as the Weekly. Normally not more than three Special Reports are printed per week, and on rare occasions none has been produced. The criteria applied to articles in the Weekly apply generally to Special Reports also. Topics for Special Reports, however, are more general, requiring more lengthy treatment and more extensive analysis. Another distinction is that the events dealt with in Weekly articles have usually occurred during the week or so prior to publication, whereas those discussed in a Special Report may cover a much larger time span.

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